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Drug Dealer or Murderer? Pennsylvania’s
Approach to Drug Delivery Resulting in
Death
Stormie B. Mauck*
ABSTRACT
Drug overdoses are rapidly increasing and are now tragically one of
the leading causes of death of young adults in Pennsylvania. To combat
this problem, Pennsylvania began aggressively charging individuals
responsible for distributing drugs that were the cause of an overdose death
under Section 2506 of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code: Drug Delivery
Resulting in Death. The crime—which was originally classified as thirddegree murder but is now a first-degree felony—requires that the
defendant acted recklessly in distributing drugs to another person, and
carries a maximum prison sentence of 40 years.
As drug addiction rates continue to soar across the country, many
other states are enacting similar statutes in an attempt to dissuade drug
dealers from distributing drugs. While the desired effect of the statutes is
the same, the approach varies drastically from state to state. If viewed as a
spectrum, Section 2506 falls somewhere in the middle between other state
statutes ranging from embracing leniency to imposing strict liability.
Proponents of charging individuals under Section 2506 believe that a
conviction will hold drug dealers responsible for their actions and will
deter others from distributing drugs. Critics, however, argue that Section
2506 has not been proven to reduce the number of drug overdose deaths
or to deter dealers.
This Comment will detail the elements of Section 2506 and explain
how Section 2506 has withstood multiple constitutional challenges by
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2019. This Comment
is dedicated in loving memory of my father, Brian Lane Mauck (8/22/63 – 9/22/16), who
instilled in me a love of writing through his own success as an author, and who would have
loved nothing more than to see his daughter published. I would like to thank my daughter
for being my inspiration to be better, my fiancé for being my constant shoulder to rely on,
my mother for being my biggest cheerleader in life, and my friends and family for all their
love and support while writing this Comment. Finally, I also like to thank all the members
of Penn State Law Review for their dedication and hard work on Volume 123. We did it!
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individuals charged under the statute. This Comment will then compare
Section 2506 to similar statutes of other states to analyze whether a better
approach exists. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that the best
approach is to charge drug dealers under the traditional drug distribution
statutes and use the funds currently expended on investigating and
prosecuting individuals under Section 2506 to expand Pennsylvania’s
current drug addiction programs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 24, 2014, Ryan Kemp purchased ten bags of heroin.1 Mr.
Kemp struggled with drug addiction for many years and had
unsuccessfully attempted treatment.2 After making the purchase, Mr.
Kemp invited Elizabeth Kline Smeltzer to his home, where the two used
heroin that night.3 Mr. Kemp then fell asleep, and when he awoke, Ms.
1. Commonwealth v. Kemp, No. CP-14-CR-0000547-2014, 2015 Pa. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 4193, at *1—2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2015).
2. Clayton Over, Kline Smeltzers Seek Rehab Over Lengthy Prison Sentence for Man
Convicted in Daughter’s Fatal Overdose, CENTRE DAILY TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014),
http://www.centredaily.com/news/article42896046.html.
3. Kemp, 2015 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4193, at *1—2.
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Kline Smeltzer was dead.4 Her cause of death was ruled a drug overdose.5
Ms. Kline Smeltzer was only 21 years old and was a graduate of State
College Area High School and a part-time Penn State student who was
beloved by her family and friends.6
Mr. Kemp was charged with Drug Delivery Resulting in Death.7 Ms.
Kline Smeltzer’s parents, who are both pastors, asked the court for a
lenient sentence for Mr. Kemp that emphasized treatment and recovery.8
Ms. Kline Smeltzer’s parents stated, “A sentence of no longer than two
years in jail, coupled with treatment and recovery support for drug abuse
in prison and upon release would make him accountable for his actions
and provide him with an opportunity to lead a productive life afterward.”9
Her mother further explained, “For me, what would honor my daughter’s
life is for Ryan to deal with his addiction, to get out of jail and to have a
productive, meaningful life.”10 The Centre County Court of Common
Pleas Judge considered the victim’s family’s wishes, but sentenced Mr.
Kemp to 4 to 12 years imprisonment followed by a year of probation.11
Mr. Kemp was not likely the defendant the Pennsylvania legislature
had in mind when it enacted a statute allowing drug dealers to be charged
with murder after selling drugs to an individual that overdosed on the
drugs and died.12 Section 2506 of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code,13 Drug
Delivery Resulting in Death, is classified as a form of criminal homicide
that is a felony of the first degree and punishable by up to 40 years
imprisonment.14 Section 2506 was an attempt by the Pennsylvania
legislature to lower the number of drug overdose deaths; however, the
statute does not always ensure that the correct people are prosecuted.15
Drug addicts are often the individuals being prosecuted, rather than the
individuals actually responsible for manufacturing or introducing the
drugs to the area.16
This Comment will analyze Section 2506 to determine if the statute
is achieving its purpose of lowering the amounts of fatal drug overdoses
in Pennsylvania.17 This Comment will first discuss the requirements of
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Over, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Kemp, 2014 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4193, at *2—3.
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2019).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
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Section 2506 and how the statute has changed since its enactment,18 and
will then compare Pennsylvania’s laws to the laws of other states.19
Finally, this Comment will look at alternative methods for combating the
rising number of drug related deaths.20
II.

BACKGROUND

While Section 2506 seems simple on its face, the statute contains
intricacies that must be carefully considered.21 As will be discussed below,
multiple amendments were made to the statute throughout the years in
response to Pennsylvania courts’ interpretations of the statute and to
continue to ensure that the statute is effectively used.22 The Pennsylvania
courts’ interpretations of the statutes have largely been a result of criminal
defendants challenging the constitutionality of the law.23
A.

Elements of Section 2506

Section 2506 contains two main elements.24 The first makes the
Section applicable to any “person [who] intentionally administers,
dispenses, delivers, gives, prescribes, sells or distributes any controlled
substance or counterfeit controlled substance . . . .”25 As the text implies,
selling drugs is sufficient to violate the statute, but is not necessary.26
Girlfriends who give their boyfriends drugs,27 doctors who prescribe
drugs,28 and those who otherwise deliver drugs to another person all fall
within the statute’s reach.29
The second element of Section 2506 requires “another person [to die]
as a result of using the substance.”30 Courts apply a “but-for” test31 to
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Section II.A.
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See infra Section II.D for a discussion of the challenges to the constitutionality of
Section 2506.
24. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2019).
25. Id. § 2506(a).
26. Id.
27. Snejana Farberov, Woman, 27, Charged with Homicide for Giving Her
Recovering Addict Boyfriend, 19, Heroin which Killed Him, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 12, 2013),
https://dailym.ai/2InhKDo.
28. See Renatta Signorini & Debra Erdley, Hempfield Doctor Charged with
Prescribing Drugs that Killed Woman, TRIB LIVE (Apr. 26, 2017, 12:06 PM),
http://bit.ly/2DccD5q.
29. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506.
30. Id.
31. See But-for Causation, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012) (“But-for
causation is an easily remembered phrase for a necessary cause, in that if this cause had
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determine if the defendant’s actions sufficiently caused the death.32 Heroin
is especially pervasive in Pennsylvania and is the cause in many of
Pennsylvania’s overdose deaths,33 which caused many courts to consider
the particularly dangerous effects of this drug.34 The Pennsylvania
Superior Court has found that the defendant who delivered the heroin is
the but-for cause of a victim’s death, even where other drugs were in the
victim’s system, as long as the dose of heroin administered was a lethal—
or potentially lethal—dose.35
Further, in its 2019 opinion of Commonwealth v. Peck,36 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court found that drug delivery, the first element of
Section 2506, does not need to take place in Pennsylvania as long as the
death caused by the use of the drug, the second element, occurs in
Pennsylvania.37 In Peck, the defendant sold drugs in Maryland which
resulted in the overdose death of the victim in Pennsylvania.38 The
defendant argued that a “violation of Pennsylvania’s Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act (CSDDCA) is a necessary
element of [Section 2506],” and because the delivery took place in
Maryland, he could not be convicted.39 The court concluded Section 102
of Pennsylvania’s criminal code “clearly establishes that acts occurring
outside of Pennsylvania may be subject to criminal prosecution in
Pennsylvania, particularly when a death occurs within Pennsylvania.”40
Thus, where the elements of Section 2506 are met, delivery occurring
outside of Pennsylvania does not bar conviction.41
not happened, then this result could not have followed. In other words but for this cause,
this effect could not have occurred.”).
32. See Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986, 993 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015)
(“The statute, therefore, is clear as to the level of causation. It requires a ‘but- for’ test of
causation.”); see also John J. Dvorske, Drug Delivery Resulting in Death is a Felony, 5B
SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 29:75 (West 2019) (“[T]he statute requires a ‘but-for’
test of causation and, thus, is not unconstitutionally vague as to the level of causation
necessary for guilt.”).
33. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. PHILA. DIV. & UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH, JOINT INTELLIGENCE
REPORT: ANALYSIS OF OVERDOSE DEATHS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 2016, at 5 (July 2017),
http://bit.ly/2v13tV6 [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF OVERDOSE DEATHS IN PENNSYLVANIA].
34. See Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 269 (Pa Super. Ct. 2017); see also
Kakhankham, 132 A.3d at 996.
35. See Proctor, 156 A.3d at 269.
36. Commonwealth v. Peck, 202 A.3d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019).
37. Id. at 743.
38. Id. at 739.
39. Id. at 742.
40. Id. at 743.
41. See id. (“Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that (1) although the
conduct, i.e., the delivery, occurred in Maryland, it was in violation of Pennsylvania’s
CSDDCA, (2) a death resulted from the delivery, and (3) Appellant acted recklessly when
causing Decedent’s death. Therefore, even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict
Appellant of the delivery under Section 102, the Commonwealth still established the
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Mens Rea Requirements

The mens rea requirement for the first element of the statute is clearly
articulated as “intentional.”42 However, the Pennsylvania legislature did
not explicitly include a mens rea requirement for the second element of
Section 2506.43 Criminal defendants have argued that because the
Pennsylvania legislature did not articulate a mens rea requirement for the
second element, it intended that the scienter requirement from the first
element should apply to the second element as well.44 However, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Kakhankham45
concluded that the required mens rea was “at least recklessly.”46
The court reasoned that while the statute does not specifically state
what the mens rea requirement is for the second element of the statute, a
recklessness standard could be inferred from Section 302 of the
Pennsylvania Criminal Code,47 which provides that the default mens rea
for statutes that do not include one is intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly.48 The court found that the act of providing heroin alone is
enough to establish reckless conduct because heroin is “an inherently
dangerous drug and the risk of such a lethal result is certainly
foreseeable.”49 Thus, intentionally providing heroin to another person
satisfies the mens rea requirement for both elements of the statute.50 While
this holding was specific to heroin, the same reasoning could apply to other
inherently dangerous drugs, such as fentanyl or other prescription opioids.
C.

Amendments to Section 2506

Section 2506 was originally enacted in 1989 during the expanded
War on Drugs initiated by then President Ronald Reagan.51 The law
sufficiency of the evidence of a Drug Delivery Resulting in Death.”) (internal citations
omitted).
42. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a) (West 2019).
43. See id.
44. See Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986, 992–93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
45. Id. at 993.
46. Id. at 995.
47. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(c) (West 2019). The statute provides
in relevant part: “When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an
offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” Id.
48. Id.
49. See Kakhankham, 132 A.3d at 996 (citing Minn. Fire and Cas. Co. v. Greenfield,
855 A.2d 854, 870–71 (Pa. 2004)).
50. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2019).
51. Act of Dec. 22, 1989, No. 109, 1989 Pa. Laws 773 (codified as amended at 18 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506); see also A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG
POLICY ALLIANCE, https://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war (last visited
Oct. 15, 2017) (“The presidency of Ronald Reagan marked the start of a long period of

2019

DRUG DEALER OR MURDERER?

819

originally classified Drug Delivery Resulting in Death as murder in the
third degree, and carried a minimum sentence of five years.52 The first
amendment to the statute came in 1998,53 after the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held the statute was unconstitutional in 1996.54 To solve this issue,
the 1998 amendment to Section 2506 repealed a provision of the statute
that stated defendants do not need notice of the applicability of the statute
before their conviction.55 The law then remained substantially unchanged
until it was amended again in 2011.56
The 2011 amendments were the result of a 2005 Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision that held the prosecution was required to prove
malice in order obtain a conviction for Drug Delivery Resulting in Death
because it was a form of murder in the third degree.57 Proving malice made
it very difficult for the prosecution to successfully convict a defendant
under Section 2506.58 The 2011 amendments’ recharacterization of the
crime thus lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof.59
In addition, the 2011 amendments deleted the mandatory minimum
sentence of 5 years and added a maximum sentence of 40 years.60 The
legislature also reclassified Drug Delivery Resulting in Death as a felony
of the first degree.61 Although the crime is no longer considered murder in
skyrocketing rates of incarceration, largely thanks to his unprecedented expansion of the
drug war. The number of people behind bars for nonviolent drug law offenses increased
from 50,000 in 1980 to over 400,000 by 1997.”).
52. 1989 Pa. Laws. at 773.
53. Act of Feb. 18, 1998, No. 19, 1998 Pa. Laws 102 (codified as amended at 18 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506).
54. See Commonwealth v. Highhawk, 687 A.2d 1123, 1192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(finding Section 2506 to be unconstitutional because subsection (c) of the 1989 version of
the statute did not provide fair notice of the prohibited conduct).
55. Section 2506(c), 1989 Pa. Laws. at 773 (repealed 1998). This subsection provided
in relevant part:
Proof of sentencing.—Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the
crime. Notice of the applicability of this section to the defendant shall not be
required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth’s
intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and
before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at
sentencing. The court shall consider evidence presented at trial, shall afford the
Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present necessary additional
evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section
is applicable.
Id.
56. Act of July 7, 2011, No. 40, 2011 Pa. Laws 220 (codified as amended at 18 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506).
57. Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 631 (Pa. 2005).
58. Richard Gazarik, Changed Pennsylvania Law May Prompt More Charges in Fatal
Overdoses, TRIB LIVE (Mar. 19, 2014 11:36 PM), http://tinyurl.com/y5j2olll.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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the third degree, Drug Delivery Resulting in Death is still considered a
form of criminal homicide.62
The 2011 amendments to Section 2506 also created a need to amend
Section 9714 of the Pennsylvania criminal sentencing laws.63 Section 9714
provides sentences for second degree and lesser offenses, and the
amendments to Section 9714 specifically added Drug Delivery Resulting
in Death to the definition of “crime of violence.”64 Because murder of the
third degree was already classified as a crime of violence, Section 9714
needed to be amended to keep Drug Delivery Resulting in Death within
the scope of Section 9714’s sentence enhancements for repeat offenders.65
The Pennsylvania Legislature amended Section 2506 again in 2014.66
This amendment added subsection (b)(2), which states that the penalty
section, which imposes a 40-year maximum sentence,67 would not apply
to convictions where the victim was under 13 years of age.68 While the
majority of the Section 2506 amendments were a result of court decisions,
many of the cases challenging the constitutionality of Section 2506 were
unsuccessful.69
D.

Constitutionality Challenges

Criminal defendants often challenge the constitutionality of Section
2506.70 The typical constitutional challenge is that the statute is void for

62. Id. Criminal homicide is the term that relates to the action of a defendant who
“intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes the death of another human
being.” The term also includes murder of any degree, involuntary manslaughter, and
voluntary manslaughter. Karl Oakes & Kimberly C. Simmons, Definition and
classification of criminal homicide, generally, 4 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 12:1
(West 2019).
63. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714 (West 2019).
64. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714(g) (defining Drug Delivery
Resulting in Death as a crime of violence); see also H.R. 396, 194th Leg., 3rd Spec. Sess.
(Pa. June 11, 2011) (expressing legislative intent to continue to treat Drug Delivery
Resulting in Death as a crime of violence).
65. H.R. 396, 194th Leg., 3rd Spec. Sess. (Pa. June 11, 2011)
66. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506 (West 2019).
67. Id. § 2506(b)(1).
68. See id. § 2506(b)(2) (seemingly indicating that drug delivery resulting in the death
of a victim under 13 years of age could be subject to a longer sentence).
69. See infra Section II.D.
70. See Commonwealth v. Storey, 167 A.3d 750, 755–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017); see
also Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 627–28 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v.
Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 265–66 (Pa Super. Ct. 2017); Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132
A.3d 986, 989–90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); Commonwealth v. Costa, 861 A.2d 358, 360–61
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Commonwealth v. Nahavandian, 849 A.2d 1221, 1226 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004).
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vagueness,71 but defendants have also argued that the statute imposed a
sentence that violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment.72 Constitutional challenges to Section 2506 have
generally been unsuccessful in Pennsylvania courts.73
1. Void for Vagueness
In the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s first opinion interpreting the
meaning of Section 2506, Commonwealth v. Highhawk,74 the court held
that the statute was void for vagueness.75 The trial court concluded that
Section 2506 was nothing more than a statute providing sentencing
guidelines, not a new crime a defendant could be charged with.76 The
Superior Court disagreed and concluded that although the statute’s text
was “unclear and ambiguous,”77 the legislature intended to create a new
crime.78 However, the Superior Court held that even though the legislature
created a new crime, subsection (c) of Section 250679 made it
unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it “fail[ed] to provide fair
notice of the prohibited conduct.”80
Following the 1998 amendment, which repealed the provision of
Section 2506 that the court in Highhawk found unconstitutional, the
constitutionality of the statute was not questioned before an appellate court
again until 2004.81 In 2004, the Superior Court decided Commonwealth v.
Nahavandian82 and Commonwealth v. Costa.83 The defendants in both
cases argued that Section 2506 was void for vagueness, as it did not
71. See Storey, 167 A.3d at 755–56; see also Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 627–28; Proctor,
156 A.3d at 265–66; Kakhankham, 132 A.3d at 989–90; Costa, 861 A.2d at 360–61;
Nahavandian, 849 A.2d at 1226.
72. See Proctor, 156 A.3d at 265–66; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
73. See Storey, 167 A.3d at 757; see also Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 631; Proctor, 156 A.3d
at 267–68, 276; Kakhankham, 132 A.3d at 992; Costa, 861 A.2d at 365; Nahavandian, 849
A.2d at 1226. But see Commonwealth v. Highhawk, 687 A.2d 1123, 1129 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996).
74. Highhawk, 687 A.2d at 1125 (“We are called upon to interpret, for the first time,
the meaning of this statutory provision.”).
75. Id. at 1129. Due process requires that criminal statutes be sufficiently clear to give
reasonable notice of the conduct that will be considered a crime under the statute. Id. at
1128–29. If a statute is “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning”, a court will find the statute to be unconstitutional for being void for
vagueness. Id. at 1128.
76. Id. at 1124.
77. Id. at 1125.
78. Id. at 1127.
79. See supra note 55.
80. Highhawk, 687 A.2d at 1129.
81. Commonwealth v. Nahavandian, 849 A.2d 1221, 1226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); see
also Commonwealth v. Costa, 861 A.2d 358, 360–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
82. Commonwealth v. Nahavandian, 849 A.2d 1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
83. Commonwealth v. Costa, 861 A.2d 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
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include a specific mens rea requirement.84 The court found in both cases,
however, that because the statute indicated Drug Delivery Resulting in
Death was a type of third degree murder, the legislature meant to
incorporate the common law mental state of third degree murder: malice.85
Thus, the court found in both cases that the statute was not
unconstitutionally void.86
Following these two decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Ludwig87 reached the same decision and followed the
same reasoning as the Superior Court in Nahavandian and Costa.88 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that “the mental state of malice
aforethought is significantly more than mere carelessness or neglect, or the
disregard of a chance or possibility of death, and it is this special frame of
mind that is required to obtain a conviction under Section 2506.”89 The
court then turned to the question of whether the Commonwealth had met
its prima facie case of malice.90
In Ludwig, the defendant had sold three teenage girls double doses of
ecstasy.91 After consuming the ecstasy at a concert, fifteen-year-old
Brandy French became ill and later died of an ecstasy overdose.92 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the act of delivering an illegal
drug that did not have an “extremely high risk” of death could not be
considered malice.93 Because ecstasy is “only” a potentially dangerous
drug, the court reasoned that the act of selling ecstasy without more does
not support a finding of malice.94
The court also determined that neither the age of the girls nor the fact
that the ecstasy was a double dose changed the malice determination
because the defendant was also a teenager, and all parties understood the
pill was a double dose.95 Finally, the court indicated that selling the drugs
to the victim, as opposed to giving the drugs to the victim, without more,
was not enough to establish malice.96 With this decision, the court
exemplified how difficult it would be for the prosecution to ever

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Nahavandian, 849 A.2d at 1226; see also Costa, 861 A.2d at 360–61.
Nahavandian, 849 A.2d at 1226; see also Costa, 861 A.2d at 365.
Nahavandian, 849 A.2d at 1226; see also Costa, 861 A.2d at 365.
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 847 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005).
Id. at 631 n.7.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 632–33.
Id.
Id. at 634.
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successfully charge a defendant with Drug Delivery Resulting in Death.97
Ultimately, this decision spurred the 2011 amendments to Section 2506.98
Following the 2011 amendments, which reclassified Drug Delivery
Resulting in Death as a felony of the first degree to avoid making the
prosecution prove malice,99 the statute’s constitutionality was again
challenged in 2015.100 The defendant in Kakhankham argued the statute
was unconstitutionally vague because it did not clearly indicate the
required mens rea or level of causation required for conviction.101 The
court found that the required mens rea was at least recklessness,102 and that
the required level of causation was but-for causation.103 The court
reasoned the defendant’s sale of a bundle of heroin to the victim was the
but-for cause of the victim’s death by overdose and rose to the level of
recklessness, thereby meeting both requirements at the heart of the void
for vagueness challenge.104
The next void for vagueness challenge came in 2017 in the Superior
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Proctor.105 The defendant in
Proctor attempted to distinguish his case from the Kakhankham decision
because the victim’s death was caused by a mixture of heroin the
defendant had provided and other drugs the defendant did not know the
victim had taken.106 The defendant argued the statute failed to give
adequate notice “that engaging in criminal conduct, but conduct that does
not generally cause death, can, in some rare and unlucky situations, be the
source of criminal liability for the unforeseen and unforeseeable death of
a third party.”107
The court responded by placing importance on the fact that the
amount of heroin the victim ingested was a lethal dose, or a potentially
lethal dose, even withstanding the other drugs in the victim’s system.108
Because the dose was potentially fatal on its own, the court determined it
97. Ludwig, 847 A.2d at 632–33 (finding that the prosecution could not use the
delivery of an illegal drug as evidence of malice because it is the first element of the crime,
and using an existing element of the crime to prove malice would make the statute a strict
liability crime); see also Gazarik, supra note 58 (quoting Westmoreland County District
Attorney: “We no longer have to prove intent. That didn’t make sense. Why would a drug
dealer want to kill his customer?”).
98. See Gazarik, supra note 58.
99. Act of July 7, 2011, No. 40, 2011 Pa. Laws 220 (codified as amended at 18 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506).
100. Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986, 989–90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 994.
103. Id. at 993.
104. Id. at 995–96.
105. Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
106. Id. at 268.
107. Id. at 267.
108. Id. at 267–68.

824

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:3

was foreseeable that the person could die.109 Therefore, the statute was not
vague as it applied to the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s
case.110
Finally, the most recent void for vagueness challenge occurred in the
Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Storey.111 Like the
defendant in Proctor, the defendant here attempted to distinguish his case
from Kakhankham by arguing that he sold heroin to an individual who was
obtaining the drugs for a third party that later overdosed on the heroin.112
Thus, the defendant argued that the statute did not give adequate notice
that he could be liable for the death of a third party he had no knowledge
of.113 The court found this distinction to be immaterial because the statute
only required that “another person dies as a result of using the
substance,”114 not necessarily the person who purchased drugs from the
defendant.115 Thus, the court in Storey also found that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case.116
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In addition to the void for vagueness challenge, the defendant in
Proctor also argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.117 The defendant argued the statute violated the Eighth
Amendment because “[the defendant] was a drug addict and never
intended to cause any loss of life and the statute permits severely
disproportionate punishments of individuals tangentially involved in a
drug overdose.”118 The defendant in Proctor was ultimately sentenced to
“an aggregate sentence of 12 years and 10 months to 26 years and 10
months of incarceration.”119 The court, however, upheld the statute as
constitutional because the sentence did not lead to an “inference of gross
disproportionality” when it was viewed in light of the fact that the
defendant’s conduct caused the death of a young man.120
Thus, despite multiple challenges to the constitutionality of Section
2506 before the Pennsylvania appellate courts, the statute remains on the
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 269.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Storey, 167 A.3d 750, 755–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
Id. at 757.
Id.
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a) (West 2019) (emphasis added).
Storey, 167 A.3d at 757.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 266 (Pa Super. Ct. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 275–76.
Id. at 276.
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books in an attempt to deter drug dealers.121 However, the current use of
Section 2506 may not reflect what the legislature likely intended to effect
with the statute.122 Further, the statute can be very difficult to apply, and
little evidence suggests that it has made a difference in reducing drug
overdose deaths in Pennsylvania.123 In fact, the number of drug overdoses
in Pennsylvania continues to rise,124 suggesting different or additional
action needs to be taken to combat this issue.
III.

ANALYSIS

Rising drug overdose deaths is not a problem unique to
Pennsylvania.125 In fact, the federal government and a substantial number
of states have statutes similar to Pennsylvania’s Drug Delivery Resulting
in Death.126 Additionally, many states that do not have a specific statute
charge drug dealers with felony murder or voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter.127 Compared to Pennsylvania, some states have statutes that
are more lenient, and some states have statutes that are less lenient.128
This part of this Comment will compare Pennsylvania’s Section 2506
to other states’ statutes regarding drug delivery resulting in death to
address the concerns with these statutes and evaluate what portions of the
statutes are effective.129 This part will then detail alternative approaches to

121. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a) (West 2019).
122. See Commonwealth v. Highhawk, 687 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(“Section 2506 clearly represents an attempt to control the number of deaths related to
controlled substances.”).
123. See infra Part III.
124. See ANALYSIS OF OVERDOSE DEATHS IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 33, at 5 (“In
2016, 4,642 drug-related overdose deaths were reported by Pennsylvania coroners and
medical examiners, an increase of 37 percent increase from 2015. In 2016, approximately
13 people died of a drug-related overdose each day.”).
125. See Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018).
126. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(viii) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also ALASKA STAT. §
11.41.120(a)(3) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(e) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 4752B (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3)-(4)(West 2019); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.3 (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5430 (West 2019); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:30.1(3) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a (West 2019); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.195(b) (West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(IX) (2019); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:35-9 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17(b)(2) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
701.7(B) (2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-6 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a)(2)
(2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4250 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415 (West
2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(2)(a)-(b)
(West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (2019).
127. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY DRUGINDUCED HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE 2 (Nov. 2017),
http://bit.ly/2Uwvi1I.
128. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
129. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
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charging individuals under these statutes.130 This Comment will then argue
that charging individuals under these types of statutes is ineffective to
reduce the amount of overdose deaths and that an alternative approach
focusing on treating addiction would be more effective.131
A.

Statutes More Lenient than Pennsylvania’s

While Pennsylvania’s Section 2506 is one of the more lenient
approaches to addressing drug overdose deaths,132 some states have much
more forgiving statutes.133 The statutes are more lenient in different
aspects, including lesser sentences, how often individuals are charged
under the statutes, and restrictions placed on who can be charged.134
1. Washington
Section 69.50.415 of Washington’s Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, Controlled Substances Homicide, was enacted in 1987.135 Section
69.50.415 provides, “A person who unlawfully delivers a controlled
substance . . . which . . . is subsequently used by the person to whom it was
delivered, resulting in the death of the user, is guilty of controlled
substances homicide.”136 Section 69.50.415 is considered a class B felony
in Washington,137 which is punishable by confinement in a state
correctional facility for up to 10 years, a fine up to $20,000, or both.138
Section 69.50.415 differs from Section 2506 of the Pennsylvania
Criminal Code in many ways. Most obvious is that Section 69.50.415 is
classified as a class B felony,139 the second highest felony in the state,140
while Section 2506 is a first-degree felony,141 the highest in the state.142
Section 69.50.415 also carries a maximum sentence of 10 years,143 while
Section 2506 carries a maximum sentence of 40 years.144 Section 2506’s

130. See infra Section III.C.
131. See infra Section III.C.
132. See infra Section III.A.
133. See infra Section III.A.
134. See infra Section III.A.
135. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415 (West 2019).
136. Id. § 69.50.415(1).
137. Id. § 69.50.415(2).
138. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (West 2019).
139. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415(2).
140. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(b).
141. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a) (West 2019).
142. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103(1) (West 2019).
143. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(b).
144. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(b)(1). A sentence of 40 years is double
the normal maximum sentence for first degree felonies in Pennsylvania under 18 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103(1) (West 2019).
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longer maximum sentence is problematic when viewed in light of the fact
that many of the individuals charged under Section 2506 are addicts
themselves or simply shared drugs with the victim.145 Long sentences for
these individuals are disproportionate to their actions and do not address
the underlying problem in many cases—the addiction.146
Further, studies have shown that longer sentences do not have
stronger effects on deterrence.147 For punishments to deter individuals
from committing a crime, the individuals must take the time to consider
what the consequences of committing the crime will be.148 Those suffering
from drug addictions are rarely ever able to make rational decisions
relating to crimes, and those who simply share their drugs with a friend or
significant other are probably not aware that they could be charged in
connection with an overdose death.149 Thus, long sentences are often not
justified when true drug dealers are seldom convicted and the sentences
do not have a strong deterrence effect.150
Additionally, Section 69.50.415 of Washington’s Controlled
Substances Act requires that the specific person to whom the drugs were
delivered be the person who dies,151 while Section 2506 allows the charge
when any person dies as a result of delivery of the drugs.152 This is an area
where Section 2506 has the potential to be more successful at achieving
the goal of deterring drug dealers and reducing the number of drug
overdose deaths. Section 2506 allows law enforcement agencies to track
the drug involved in an overdose to the actual drug dealer in a case where
a friend or significant other buys drugs and then shares the drugs with the
victim.153 While tracking the drugs back to the drug dealers is often very
difficult,154 Section 2506 at least makes this an option in Pennsylvania.155

145. See Joshua Vaughn, Understanding Overdose: Charges of Drug Delivery
Resulting in Death on the Rise, THE SENTINEL (Dec. 3, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/y4wx8uy6
(“A review of more than 200 cases of drug delivery homicides nationwide conducted by
Health In Justice, a program run by researchers from Northeastern University, found less
than half of the charged cases involved a typical dealer/buyer relationship.”).
146. Clarence Walker, The New War on Drug Dealers: Charging Them With Murder
When Their Customers Die of Overdose, ALTERNET (May 31, 2015),
https://www.alternet.org/drugs/overdose-murder-new-war-drug-dealers.
147. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 127, at 39.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415(1) (West 2019).
152. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a) (West 2019).
153. Id.
154. See Renatta Signorini, Pa. Investigators Struggle to Build Drug Death Cases, TRIB
LIVE (Aug. 17, 2016), http://bit.ly/2Gyb0Bi.
155. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a).
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Finally, the way individuals charged under Section 69.50.415 are
prosecuted in Washington is more lenient than in Pennsylvania.156 Some
Washington communities are focusing on public health initiatives to
combat addiction rather than prosecuting drug dealers.157 The King County
chief criminal prosecutor posed the following question:
Frankly, the debate we’re having as a community right now is: Is this
a public health issue or is this a criminal issue? Are we going to lock
people up as a way to sort of manage use among drug users and the
drug communities or are we going to try to find some way to treat it as
a public health issue with harm-reduction strategies in other things?158

As discussed fully later in this Comment, diverting resources away from
prosecuting these crimes and towards public health initiatives may be
more successful at combating overdose deaths.159 Thus, the way certain
counties in Washington are combating drug overdose deaths is likely more
effective than convicting defendants under Section 2506.
2. Wyoming
Section 6-2-108 of Wyoming’s Criminal Code is also more lenient
than Section 2506 of Pennsylvania’s Criminal Code.160 Wyoming passed
Section 6-2-108, Drug Induced Homicide, in 1995.161 Section 6-2-108
provides the following:
(a) A person is guilty of drug induced homicide if:
(i) He is an adult or is at least four (4) years older than the victim;
and
(ii) He . . . unlawfully deliver[s] a controlled substance to a minor
and that minor dies as a result of the injection, inhalation,
ingestion or administration by any other means of any amount of
that controlled substance.
(b) Except as provided in W.S. 6-2-109, drug induced homicide is a
felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more
than twenty (20) years.162

156. See infra Section III.A.
157. Taylor Mirfendereski, Fighting Heroin: Dealers Charged with Homicide When
Customers Die, KING 5 (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.king5.com/news/local/fightingheroin-dealers-charged-with-homicide-when-customers-die/424682320.
158. Id.
159. See infra Section III.C.
160. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (2019), with 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2506.
161. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108.
162. Id.
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Unlike Section 2506,163 Section 6-2-108 places an age restriction on
the individuals that can be convicted under the statue.164 Also unlike
Section 2506,165 which applies to all overdose deaths, Section 6-2-108
only applies to overdose deaths of minors.166 Additionally, the maximum
penalty under Section 6-2-108 is only 20 years imprisonment compared to
a maximum of 40 years under Section 2506.167 Thus, even though Section
6-2-108 applies only to conduct that is arguably more morally offensive,
the overdose deaths of minors, the maximum sentence is half that of
Section 2506.168
Although Section 6-2-108 was enacted 23 years ago, there are no
published cases in Wyoming that cite to the statute, and only three news
articles regarding the crime were written between 2011 and 2016.169 In
2016, the number of drug overdose deaths per 100,000 individuals in
Wyoming (17.6) was much smaller than Pennsylvania’s (37.9), but it was
still significant.170 The lack of prosecutions under Section 6-2-108 could
be due to Section 6-2-108’s restrictions on the age of the defendant and
victims or that Wyoming convicts drug dealers under its regular drug laws.
B.

Statutes Less Lenient than Pennsylvania’s

Many states have statutes that are less lenient than Pennsylvania’s.171
These include statutes with minimum sentences, longer maximum

163. Section 2506 imposes no restrictions on the age of the defendant convicted under
the statute, but the statute does state that the 40-year maximum sentence does not apply to
overdose deaths of victims under the age of 13. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2506(b)(2).
164. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108(a)(i).
165. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(b)(2).
166. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108(a)(ii). Rhode Island and Colorado also both have
statutes that apply only where an individual delivers a controlled substance to minors. See
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-6 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(e) (2018) (further
restricting homicide charges to individuals who unlawfully deliver a controlled substance
to a minor on school grounds).
167. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108(b).
168. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108(b), with 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2506(b)(1). Furthermore, Section 6-2-108’s maximum sentence is potentially even
less than half of Section 2506’s if the victim is under the age of 13. See 18 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(b)(2).
169. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 127, at 12.
170. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 125.
171. See infra Section III.B.
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sentences,172 and strict liability statutes.173 Conversely, some of state
statutes are more restrictive with who may be charged with the crime.
1. Michigan
Section 750.317a of Michigan’s Penal Code, Delivery of a Schedule
1 or 2 Controlled Substance, Death as a Felony, was enacted in 2006.174
Section 750.317a states:
A person who delivers a schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance, other
than marihuana, to another person . . . that is consumed by that person
or any other person and that causes the death of that person or other
person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any
term of years.175

While Michigan allows a person convicted under Section 750.317a to be
sentenced to life imprisonment,176 what makes Section 750.317a so severe
is that the statute creates a strict liability crime.177 As long as the individual
intended to deliver a controlled substance to another person, the individual
can be sentenced to life in prison if any person dies from using the
delivered drugs.178
Although Pennsylvania courts claim that Section 2506 is not a strict
liability crime, intentionally providing heroin to a person who dies is
sufficient to establish the “reckless” behavior required under Section
2506.179 Thus, at least when heroin is involved, in Pennsylvania all the
prosecution has to prove is that the defendant intended to distribute the
drug.180 While this is more than the Michigan statute requires, the effect is
likely the same as neither statute requires an intent to cause death.
A major concern with only having to prove intent to provide the drug
to another person is that this action does not actually cause the individual’s
death.181 Defendants cannot raise the defense that the victims contributed
172. See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 127, at 8 (“State law penalties [for Drug
Delivery Resulting in Death] vary from two years to capital punishment. In six states—
Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia—the minimum
penalty is life in prison.”).
173. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (2019) (listing the New Jersey statutory provision
titled “Strict Liability for Drug-Induced Deaths”).
174. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a (West 2019).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. People v. Plunkett, 780 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Mich. 2010) (“MCL 750.317a is a
general intent crime, and as such does not require the intent that death occur from the
controlled substance first delivered in violation of MCL 333.7401.”).
178. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a (West 2019).
179. Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 132 A.3d 986, 996 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
180. Id.
181. See Walker, supra note 146.
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to their death by choosing to use the drug.182 Thus, these statutes imply
that the individuals charged are just as culpable as murderers despite never
having the intent to kill anyone.183
Strict liability for any drug delivery resulting in death may also have
a negative impact on Good Samaritan laws.184 Section 780-113.7 of the
Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Devise, and Cosmetic Act185
provides immunity to individuals who report a drug overdose of another
person to an emergency service.186 However, the statute only provides
immunity from certain drug-related crimes and parole violations, and
Section 2506 is not included in the list.187 If individuals who distributed
drugs know that they can be sentenced for 40 years if a person dies from
an overdose without even having the intent to hurt the victim, they might
be less likely to report the overdose to the authorities.188 This means that
convictions under Section 2506 and other states’ statutes with strict
liability offenses might actually be causally related to an increase in drug
overdose deaths.189
2. Florida
Florida classifies drug delivery resulting in death as first-degree
murder.190 Subsection 782.04(1)(a)(3) of Florida’s murder statute states
that an individual is guilty of murder in the first degree when the individual
is 18 years of age or older and distributes certain substances191 that are
proven to be the proximate cause of the death of another person.192
Subsection 782.04(1)(a)(3) carries a minimum life sentence and the
possibility of a death sentence,193 while Section 2506 of Pennsylvania’s
Criminal Code imposes no minimum sentence and a maximum sentence
of 40 years.194
182. Id.
183. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 127, at 40.
184. Id.
185. 35 PA. STAT. § 780-113.7 (West 2019).
186. Id.
187. 35 PA. STAT. § 780-113.7(b).
188. See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 127, at 40.
189. See id.
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3) (West 2019).
191. The substances included in Section 782.04(1)(a)(3) are: substances controlled
under Section 893.03(1) of the Florida Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act; Cocaine;
Opium or any synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium;
Methadone; Alfentanil; Carfentanil; Fentanyl; Sufentanil; or any controlled substance
analog, as described in Section 893.0356 of Florida’s Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3)(a)-(i).
192. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3).
193. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West 2019).
194. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(b)(1) (West 2019).
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Not only does Subsection 782.04(1)(a)(3) not require any specific
intent other than unlawfully distributing drugs; if convicted, defendants
will, at a minimum, spend the rest of their life in jail and, at a maximum,
be executed without ever having intended to kill anyone.195 Possibly
allowing a drug dealer to be executed just for distributing drugs to another
person without forcing the other person to use the drugs or intending to
kill the other person is an extremely drastic approach.196 Despite the
potential sentence, the number of drug overdose deaths continue to rise in
Florida.197 Although the maximum sentence under Section 2506 is likely
extreme when viewed in light of the culpability of the defendants, it seems
much more reasonable than the maximum sentence under Subsection
782.04(1)(a)(3).
C.

Alternatives to Drug Delivery Resulting in Death Statutes

While in theory charging drug dealers with murder should deter
others from continuing to distribute drugs, drug manufacturers and highlevel drug dealers are often not the individuals being charged.198
Defendants in drug distribution cases are typically drug addicts
themselves, and, instead of being anonymous drug dealers, often have a
relationship to the individual who overdoses.199
Additionally, the fact that bringing charges under Section 2506 is
very difficult further complicates the effectiveness of Section 2506.200 The
investigation process often requires multiple officers to locate where the
drugs came from and expert medical testimony to determine the exact
cause of death.201 This tedious process means that the cost to prosecute
defendants under Section 2506, in addition to the costs associated with
incarcerating the defendants, is very high,202 despite no evidence that
Section 2506 is effective in deterring drug overdose deaths.203
Pennsylvania already has extensive drug laws which allow individuals

195. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3).
196. Id.
197. Topher Avery, Opioid Overdose Deaths Rise in Florida, ADDICTION NOW (Nov.
29, 2017), https://www.drugaddictionnow.com/2017/11/29/opioid-overdose-deaths-risein-florida/.
198. See Vaughn, supra note 145.
199. Id.
200. See Signorini, supra note 154.
201. See Signorini & Erdley, supra note 28.
202. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 127, at 52.
203. See id. at 2 (“Prosecutors and legislators who champion renewed drug- induced
homicide enforcement couch the use of this punitive measure, either naively or
disingenuously, as necessary to curb increasing rates of drug overdose deaths. But there is
not a shred of evidence that these laws are effective at reducing overdose fatalities.”)
(emphasis added).
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who distribute drugs to be charged,204 without evidence that the additional
charge of Drug Delivery Resulting in Death under Section 2506 does any
more to reduce the number of drug overdose deaths.205 If the legislature
sincerely wants to achieve this purpose, it should use taxpayer funds in
more efficient ways that are actually proven to reduce the number of drug
overdose deaths.206
1. Drug Education Programs
One way to decrease the number of drug overdose deaths in
Pennsylvania is to increase funding for overdose education programs.
These programs include Naloxone education and training programs.207
Naloxone is a drug that can reverse opioid overdoses and prevent death.208
Currently, Pennsylvanians can obtain Naloxone from a pharmacy with a
prescription from their family doctor or by using the standing order.209 The
standing order was issued by the Pennsylvania Physician General, and is
a prescription for the general public to obtain Naloxone.210
Despite the standing order, many individuals do not know they are
able to obtain the drug, and even if they do obtain it, do not know how to
use it.211 Training courses designed to instruct individuals on how to use
Naloxone can be found online.212 While increasing educational efforts will
not deter drug dealers from selling drugs, they could help prevent
thousands of overdose deaths each year.213
2. “Warm Hand-Off” Program
Additionally, a second way to decrease overdose deaths is to expand
the “Warm Hand-Off” program in Pennsylvania.214 The Pennsylvania
Department of Drug and Alcohol Programs (“DDAP”)215 started the Warm
204. See 35 PA. STAT. § 780-113 (West 2019).
205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
206. See infra Section III.C. While there are a number of other proposed alternatives to
help battle addiction, those alternatives are outside the scope of this Comment.
207. Sophie Stone, Naloxone, What is it, How to Get It, and How to Use It, PA.
GOVERNOR TOM WOLF (May 17, 2016), https://www.governor.pa.gov/blog-naloxonewhat-it-is-how-to-get-it-and-how-to-use-it/.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Warm Hand-Off, PA DEP’T OF DRUG & ALCOHOL PROGRAMS,
https://www.ddap.pa.gov/Pages/Warm-Hand-Off.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
215. The Pennsylvania Department of Drug and Alcohol Programs was originally part
of the Department of Health but was separated into its own department in 2012 as part of
the Commonwealth’s strong commitment to reducing drug and alcohol addiction. DDAP’s
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Hand-Off program in 2016 to assist overdose survivors treated in
emergency departments by offering to transfer them directly to drug
treatment facilities.216 The logic behind the program follows care provided
by medical professionals after other catastrophic health emergencies—
such as a heart attack.217 Following administering emergency care to save
the lives of individuals having a heart attack is the second step of ensuring
the individuals get the follow up care with a cardiologist that they need.218
With the Warm Hand-Off program, Pennsylvania is recognizing that there
is also a necessary second step of treatment following an overdose.219
In 2017, the Warm Hand-Off program was in effect in Harrisburg and
a small number of other communities.220 As of August 2017, Dauphin
County offered treatment through the Warm Hand-Off program to 116
individuals who survived an overdose.221 Of those 116 individuals, 50
accepted the offer and started treatment through the program. 222 The 66
individuals that declined treatment were paired with a caseworker who
discussed treatment options with the individuals and their families.223 In
early 2018, DDAP held regional summits throughout Pennsylvania to
brainstorm how to implement and improve Warm Hand-Off programs in
different counties.
For the Warm Hand Off program to be successful across
Pennsylvania, the state would also have to invest either in expanding
existing treatment facilities or creating additional facilities.224 The lack of
available and affordable treatment facilities is a nationwide problem.225
According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, only 11% of people who needed drug and alcohol
treatment in 2013 were able to obtain treatment.226 Increasing available
treatment facilities, in combination with the Warm Hand Off program, will
mission is to “to engage, coordinate and lead the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s effort
to prevent and reduce drug, alcohol and gambling addiction and abuse; and to promote
recovery, thereby reducing the human and economic impact of the disease.” About DDAP,
PA DEP’T OF DRUG & ALCOHOL PROGRAMS, https://www.ddap.pa.gov/Pages/About.aspx
(last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
216. Id.
217. Spotlight: Pennsylvania’s Warm Hand-Off, ADDICTION POLICY FORUM (July
2018), http://tinyurl.com/y2rlrkc4.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. David Wenner, ‘Warm Handoffs’ Working in Pa. to Connect Overdose Survivors
with Treatment, PENN LIVE (Aug. 15, 2017), http://tinyurl.com/y2jdgodq.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Liz Szabo, Addiction Treatment Hard to Find, Even as Overdose Deaths Soar,
USA TODAY (May 14, 2015), https://bit.ly/31iIRFR.
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not likely deter drug dealers from selling drugs. The program could,
however, save the lives of thousands of Pennsylvanians and drastically
reduce the demand for drugs.
3. Drug Courts
One final way to combat overdose deaths is to expand the drug court
programs across the state. Pennsylvania drugs courts allow individuals to
receive treatment instead of incarceration for certain crimes.227 Drug
courts are described in Pennsylvania as “combin[ing] intensive judicial
supervision, mandatory drug testing, treatment and incentives to help
offenders with substance abuse problems break the cycle of addiction and
crime.”228 While each drug court across Pennsylvania works differently,
they are all guided by a nationally recognized framework that includes ten
key initiatives, such as access to treatment and frequent drug and alcohol
testing.229 The majority of studies conducted to assess the effectiveness of
drug courts show that they are effective in reducing recidivism.230
Pennsylvania drug courts hold individuals distributing drugs accountable
for their actions while also addressing the underlying problem of the
addiction, which can be effective at reducing drug overdose deaths.231
Currently, Pennsylvania has drug courts in 45 of its 67 counties.232
However, the drug courts do not have sufficient funding to accept all of
the individuals that qualify for the programs.233 When all costs are
considered, drug courts save the state thousands of dollars per
defendant.234 Unlike the long prison sentences defendants convicted under
227. Drug Courts, THE UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA,
http://www.pacourts.us/judicial-administration/court-programs/drug-courts (last visited
Apr. 21, 2019).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Edward J. Latessa & Angela K. Reitler, What Works in Reducing Recidivism and
How Does it Relate to Drug Courts?, 41 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 757, 767—68 (2015).
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(reporting that many who would stand to benefit from drug court programs “fall through
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234. See Latessa & Reitler, supra note 230, at 776 (discussing an Oregon drug court
study that found that “[d]ue to fewer new crimes and reduced incarceration, the average
cost savings per drug court participant was $6,812; this figure increases to $16,933 when
victimization costs are included”); see also Do Drug Courts Work? Findings from Drug
Court Research, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, https://nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-
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Section 2506 may serve,235 defendants enrolled in drug courts get the drug
addiction treatment they need.236 Treatment has a real effect on lowering
the number of drug overdose deaths, unlike convicting defendants under
Section 2506.237
Drug courts allow defendants to focus on beating their addictions and
force them to work on improving their lives.238 One defendant, Dylan,
explained that “[d]rug court changed my life.” Dylan broke his neck when
he was 13 years old, and was prescribed prescription painkillers.239 Like
so many others, this prescription turned into a crippling heroin
addiction.240 During his fight for sobriety, Dylan was in and out of jail, and
attempted rehab.241 When he relapsed again, he told the court to lock him
up; however, Dylan explained “[the drug court administrators] saw in me
something I did not see in myself.”242 After completing drug court, Dylan
celebrated two years of sobriety in November 2018.243 Imprisoning addicts
typically does not help address their underlying addiction. Participation in
drug courts, however, allow addicts to battle their addiction and make
meaningful changes to their lives.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Pennsylvania’s current approach to reducing the number of drug
overdose deaths, Section 2506, is ineffective and often punishes the wrong
individuals.244 As it stands, drug addicts may face imprisonment of up to
40 years for simply sharing drugs with a friend who overdoses and may
never receive the possibility of treatment.245 This approach is very costly
courts/Pages/work.aspx (last updated May 1, 2018) (“Compared to traditional criminal
justice system processing, treatment and other investment costs averaged $1,392 lower per
drug court participant. Reduced recidivism and other long-term program outcomes resulted
in public savings of $6,744 on average per participant (or $12,218 if victimization costs
are included).”).
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or wearing a patch that can detect use. Participants are in the program for an average of 18
months.”).
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and does nothing to address the drug addiction epidemic in
Pennsylvania.246 Neither a more lenient nor strict liability approach would
increase Section 2506’s effectiveness.247
Reliance on Section 2506 is ultimately unnecessary because
Pennsylvania’s current drug distribution laws can effectively punish
individuals guilty of illegally delivering drugs.248 The funds currently used
to investigate overdose deaths as murders, prosecute defendants, and
incarcerate defendants under Section 2506 should instead be used to
combat addiction in a meaningful way, such as state funded rehabilitative
programs.249 By treating drug addicts as humans with a disease instead of
as criminals, Pennsylvania can drastically reduce the number of lives lost
to drug overdoses.
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